The Two Banks Network: The UAE's Five-Key Influence Apparatus on the Coasts of Yemen and the Horn of Africa (Special Analysis)

The Yemeni war has evolved from a purely internal struggle over power or territory into a strategic laboratory reshaping the region's balance of power. Through its involvement in the Arab Coalition, the UAE did not confine itself to a direct military role. Instead, it developed a new model of influence based on controlling ports and maritime corridors, creating a network that stretches from the Yemeni coasts to the Horn of Africa.

 

This approach has transformed the Red Sea and Arabian Sea into a continuous sphere of influence, where Abu Dhabi employs a geopolitical logic that turns islands and ports into tools of control as much as trade corridors.

 

UN documents and analyses from research centers such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Stratfor indicate that the UAE treats the sea not as a natural boundary but as a bridge for influence. Since 2015, it has quietly constructed a network of bases, ports, and local and international partnerships.

 

A 2022 Stratfor report notes: "The UAE is building an undeclared maritime influence network stretching from the Gulf of Aden to Berbera, managed through local proxies and interlocking security structures."

 

This analysis examines the network as an integrated system with five operational keys: the Source in Shabwa and Marrah, the Lip at Balhaf, the Tower at Al-Riyan, the Central Switchboard at Perim (Native name: Mayyun), and the Workshop at Mocha. A land-sea influence network managed by Abu Dhabi via local proxies revolves around these nodes, extending to the African coast with positions in Assab and Berbera. Through this interconnected map, the sea emerges not as a backdrop to Yemeni events but as the engine of regional power politics.

 

This system is grounded in the philosophy of “influence by proxy”—managing interests through local partners who provide political and operational cover while Abu Dhabi maintains a low-cost, high-impact presence. A 2023 Carnegie Center report describes this as a “strategy of control through indirect management, using development and security tools simultaneously to build a permanent presence without overt occupation.”

 

In this framework, Yemen’s maritime space is political, not merely geographic. Islands and ports are not military footnotes; they form the backbone of a UAE foreign policy aimed at securing energy and navigation routes while balancing regional powers on both sides of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

 

This study tracks the expansion node by node to deconstruct what can be described as the UAE’s “influence apparatus” in the Two Banks Network.

 

When Geography Becomes Foreign Policy

 

Yemen cannot be understood from its interior alone; its story begins at the sea. The corridor from Bab al-Mandab to the Arabian Sea, extending from the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal, forms a geographical artery where politics, economics, and security intersect. Energy and goods flow along this line—and so does power. French geographer Jean-Louis Richard noted in 2020: “The history of a coast that was always coveted more than it could ever claim.”

 

Since the UAE entered the war in 2015, the Yemeni sea became a strategic framework for regional influence. A 2022 ICG report observes: “Abu Dhabi developed a unique model of geographic expansion based on control via infrastructure rather than direct occupation.” This model relied on:

 

Logistical nodes (ports, airports, bases, islands) Activation of local proxies (Southern Transitional Council, Giants Brigades, Elite Forces, Tariq Saleh’s units) Extensions on the African coast (Assab, Berbera, Port Sudan)

 

In July 2019, the UAE announced a “redeployment” of its forces in Yemen, presented as a move from war toward peace. UN field reports, however, described it as a formal withdrawal. Abu Dhabi reduced its direct military presence but maintained its network through proxies, managed from coastal bases and islands. The Financial Times (Nov 2020) called this a “model of quiet hegemony that allows the UAE to hold the keys to the sea without raising its flag on any island.”

 

This strategic pivot made Yemen a launchpad for “cross-bank influence.” While Assab (Eritrea) served as the initial West Coast launchpad in 2015, consolidation on Yemeni islands formed an interconnected chain: Perim, Socotra, Abd al-Kuri, Al-Riyan, Balhaf, Mocha. A 2023 Abaad Centre study described this as “transforming the Yemeni sea into an economic-military security zone under indirect management, enabling control over energy and navigation lines without declaring direct sovereignty.”

 

From this perspective, the Yemeni sea becomes not just a geographical facade but an axis of regional influence. Yemen is the corridor, but the sea is the goal. With every node built or managed, the features of an influence apparatus investing in geography as a tool of foreign policy become clearer. Thus, it can be said that Yemen was the entrance, but the sea is the objective, and the two banks together represent the new laboratory of influence in modern Middle Eastern equations.

 

Shabwa - Marrah Camp: The Internal Anchors and the Resource Vault

 

Deep in Shabwa governorate, near the oil pipelines extending from Bayhan and Marib to Balhaf, lies Marrah Camp, which since 2016 has represented one of the most important pillars of Emirati influence in Yemen's interior.

 

This site was not just a military barracks but a cornerstone for shaping an integrated security architecture that combines control of the land with securing energy routes. A 2022 ICG report states that "Marrah Camp became the backbone of the Emirati influence network in Shabwa, and the field command center managing operations between the east and the south."

 

The first phase of the camp's construction began in 2016, establishing a temporary base under the guise of training local forces. By the end of 2017, it had become a permanent facility after adding helipads, a dirt runway nearly two kilometers long, equipment depots, and fortified command rooms. Between 2018 and 2020, the infrastructure expanded horizontally: roads were cut connecting the camp to Ataq city, Balhaf port, and the Marib line, and observation points equipped with small radars and modern communication devices were established. The third phase, which effectively began in 2021, saw the camp transformed into an integrated control center for managing security and military operations in the region, complete with underground storage and tunnels in the surrounding hills.

 

The Guardian reported in 2022 that "Marrah has become something of a logistical fortress, used to secure energy export lines and coordinate the movements of UAE-allied forces in Shabwa." The Associated Press also quoted field sources saying the camp includes an advanced monitoring center linked directly to units in Balhaf and Al-Riyan via an encrypted communications network partially managed from coastal facilities.

 

In August 2022, confrontations erupted between the UAE-backed Shabwa Defense Forces and units of the government army, ending with the former controlling Ataq city and consolidating their presence in the camp. This event redrew the governorate's security map. A tribal sheikh told Al-Monitor: "Whoever holds Marrah holds the heart of Shabwa; it is the decision center for everything related to the oil and gas lines." Since then, facilities around the camp have expanded to include field maintenance workshops, fuel storage, and additional drone landing strips.

 

A 2023 UN report noted that "the military presence in Marrah Camp transcends a local character and forms part of a regional coordination system that includes the bases in Balhaf and Perim." This connection has made Marrah a key node in what can be termed the "internal front" of the UAE's influence network in Yemen.

 

Socially, this expansion has led to friction with the local population, especially after restrictions were imposed on movement and grazing in the surrounding areas. Despite the Yemeni government's objections and considering these actions a violation of sovereignty, the camp continued to expand and build new facilities until 2024, becoming a practical symbol of the war's transformation from a conflict of frontlines to an engineering of sustainable influence within Yemen's geography.

 

Balhaf: Gas as a Tool of Foreign Policy

 

The Balhaf facility, located on the southern coast of Shabwa governorate, is no longer just an economic project for liquefying natural gas. It has transformed into an axis of the conflict over sovereignty and influence in Yemen. Since the war began, the UAE has used the site as a strategic base blending economic, military, and security dimensions, making it a meeting point for energy interests and regional influence projects.

 

A 2021 Amnesty International report described Balhaf as having "transformed from a gas export terminal into a closed security facility managed by foreign forces in coordination with local units," noting the presence of dual-use facilities at the site. A 2023 World Bank report mentioned that the disruption of gas production at Balhaf has "deprived Yemen of more than ten billion dollars in lost revenues," making it one of the most sensitive economic files in the country.

 

The expansion at Balhaf began in three phases: The first was in 2016 when permanent security protection units were established to secure the pipelines extending from Marib and Bayhan to the coast. The second, in 2018, saw the facility add structures including warehouses, silos, coastal communication stations, and maritime surveillance radars. The third, between 2020 and 2022, involved converting part of the port into a logistical monitoring center linking the energy facilities with deployment sites in Shabwa, Al-Riyan, and Perim.

 

France's Le Monde newspaper, in a 2022 report, quoted a European expert as saying: "Whoever controls Balhaf not only controls Yemeni gas, but the rhythm of economic and political movement in the South." The report noted that the site is used today as an operations room to control the flow of energy and local economic decisions.

 

Militarily, infrastructure improvements were made that allowed for the conversion of some facilities into communication centers and coastal monitoring systems. The facilities were also equipped with helipads and drone strips, giving the site a dual character combining protection and logistical management. A 2021 Reuters report indicated that "the site has seen engineering updates that allow for rapid partial operation or immediate shutdown when security dictates."

 

Politically, the Balhaf crisis was a test of the balance of power between the Yemeni government and the Coalition. In late 2021, the governor of Shabwa at the time, Mohammed bin Adio, called for the evacuation of foreign forces and the resumption of exports, but his stance led to his dismissal weeks later. An analyst at the Carnegie Middle East Center commented on the incident: "Bin Adio's removal confirmed that the decision in Balhaf transcends the authority of governors and is managed according to regional, not local, considerations."

 

This complexity has made Balhaf one of the most intricate nodes of influence in Yemen. It is not just an energy facility, but a multi-functional control node combining resource protection with the direction of economic and political decisions in the South. Over time, Balhaf has become a mirror reflecting the philosophy of Emirati influence in Yemen: a low-cost, high-yield presence that invests in the economy to stabilize security, and uses security to control the economy.

 

Al-Mukalla - Al-Riyan: The Eastern Watchtower

 

Since the liberation of Al-Mukalla from Al-Qaeda control in April 2016, Al-Riyan Airport has become a symbol of civilian infrastructure's transformation into part of a regional security system. The airport, once Hadhramaut's commercial gateway, gradually turned into a command and control center covering the maritime corridors from the Arabian Sea to the Gulf of Aden. According to a 2020 UN report, "The Arab Coalition, specifically UAE-backed forces, used Al-Riyan airport as an advanced air and maritime monitoring point as part of counter-terrorism operations in the South."

 

ICG data (2022) indicates the transformation at Al-Riyan was not purely military, but part of a broader project linking Yemeni ports and airports to an electronic surveillance network integrated with support bases in Balhaf, Perim, and Socotra. This integration gave the UAE the ability to control commercial shipping lanes in the Arabian Sea, making Al-Riyan akin to a watchtower controlling the sea's signals, not passenger flights.

 

Operationally, the airport was expanded between 2018 and 2021. Maintenance areas and new landing strips capable of receiving military aircraft and large cargo planes were added. Special facilities for fuel storage and satellite-linked ground communications were also established. A 2021 report by the Financial Times explained that "Al-Riyan has been transformed into an advanced radar node that allows tracking of ships and aircraft in the Arabian Sea, and is part of a surveillance network that extends beyond Yemen's borders."

 

Locally, the closure of the airport to civilian flights for more than six years caused a suffocating humanitarian and living crisis. Patients and students were forced to travel long distances by land to reach Seiyun or Aden airports. According to a 2022 Human Rights Watch report, "The restrictions imposed on the use of Al-Riyan airport for civilian purposes represent collective punishment for the local population." Nevertheless, regular flights only resumed on a limited basis in 2023 after local and international pressure.

 

On the security front, the airport has become a center for aerial reconnaissance and intelligence operations. Various reports indicate that drones are operated from there to monitor the Yemeni coasts and track maritime movements in the international corridor. The Washington Post (2023) quoted diplomatic sources as saying, "Al-Riyan today forms part of the maritime surveillance network extending from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Oman, making it one of the pillars of the region's maritime surveillance project."

 

This dual role has made Al-Riyan a microcosm of the UAE's control equation in Yemen: civilian infrastructure acting as a security arm, and a security structure presented as developmental protection. The airport that was once an outlet for trade and travel is now a center for coordinating surveillance and control of the sea and land alike, making it the Eastern Tower of the influence network spanning Yemen's coasts.

 

Socotra - Abd al-Kuri: The Ocean Observatory and the Junction of Loud Silence

 

At the edges of the Indian Ocean, where the Arabian Sea intersects with the approaches to the Horn of Africa, the Socotra archipelago rises as a natural anchorage and an environmental and early-warning laboratory in one. Since 2020, the pace of construction on the island and its affiliates, chief among them Abd al-Kuri to the far west, has accelerated. International press reports and open-source satellite imagery have documented the construction of a runway nearly 1,800 meters long on Abd al-Kuri, along with aprons, helipads, and facilities believed to be designated for communications and coastal surveillance.

 

France's Le Figaro mentioned that "the increasing Emirati presence in Socotra since 2020 represents a qualitative shift in the use of Yemeni islands as a laboratory for maritime expansion," while Reuters quoted diplomatic sources saying "the island has witnessed development capable of receiving transport aircraft and long-range drones." Analyses published on satellite tracking platforms also showed that the construction pattern suggests a dual function, combining logistical support with monitoring maritime corridors.

 

The archipelago's strategic importance transcends local geography, extending to regional security equations. According to a 2022 ICG report, "Socotra represents a link between the corridors extending from the Gulf of Aden to the Arabian Sea, which gives whoever controls it the ability to read shipping traffic on a large scale." This integrates with Stratfor's description of the island as a "distant eye for maritime surveillance" within a project linking the Arab and African banks.

 

But the environmental and social impact raises pressing questions. The archipelago has been on the UNESCO World Heritage list since 2008 due to its biological uniqueness. Reports from environmental experts, cited by Le Monde and National Geographic, have warned that "any unstudied military or urban expansion could threaten the fragile biodiversity." Locals speaking to independent media mentioned a change in movement patterns and traditional fishing, and restrictions on some areas that were previously open to the public.

 

In terms of structure and timeline, three main phases can be identified: an initial positioning phase (2020) by establishing observation points and leveling ground for temporary landing strips; followed by a construction phase of permanent runways and aprons (2021–2023); then a network integration phase (since 2024) linking the island to operational and communication centers in Perim, Al-Riyan, and Balhaf, transforming the archipelago into an integrated ocean observatory.

 

It can be said that Socotra, along with Abd al-Kuri, today constitutes an advanced maritime observatory and a "loud silence" in the influence equation—a presence low on flags but high on impact, monitoring the ocean and feeding the Two Banks Network with data, corridors, and maneuvering horizons extending from the Arabian Sea to Bab al-Mandab.

 

Mocha: The West Coast Workshop and Camp Force 400

 

Mocha is no longer just the historic port of coffee; it has transformed during the war into an integrated operations and logistics center, representing the industrial heart of the UAE's influence network on the West Coast. Since 2017, the port began its conversion into a massive maintenance and supply workshop, working to support the forces deployed along the coastal strip from Al-Khokha to Bab al-Mandab.

 

ICG reports (2021–2023) indicate that Mocha became the "de facto military capital of the West Coast" after the Stockholm Agreement, as offensive operations ceased and the focus shifted to long-term influence management. This shift materialized in the construction of maintenance bases for vehicles and fast boats, massive depots for equipment and ammunition, and landing strips for drones and helicopters.

 

The second phase of expansion (2019–2021) included the construction of underground facilities and fortified command rooms under the direct supervision of Emirati officers. The third phase (2022–2024) was marked by the establishment of Camp Force 404, which became the largest detention and interrogation center on the West Coast. Reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (2021–2023) documented secret prisons run by officers linked to Ammar Saleh, overseeing the detention of hundreds, some of whom were subjected to enforced disappearance. Middle East Eye quoted former detainees who described the camp as "an isolated area within a military zone, entered only by those with an Emirati permit."

 

The Washington Post (2023) noted that Mocha represents the "nerve of the Red Sea network," from which supply and coastal intelligence operations are managed. Reuters described it as the "coordination center among the five bases," indicating it provides logistical support to Perim, Balhaf, Al-Riyan, and Socotra. According to a Stratfor analysis (2023), "Mocha represents the field control workshop that ensures the continuity of operations without interruption."

 

On the civilian side, the city's identity changed radically. Traditional trade activities declined, while land and rent prices rose with the expanding military presence. A field study by local journalists (2023) described Mocha as a "city of barracks," as security and service professions replaced old civilian trades. Nevertheless, the city still performs its role as a supply gateway for the coastal line and a launching point for operations towards Perim and securing the strait.

 

From a broader perspective, Mocha represents the operational workshop for the Two Banks Network, where tools are sharpened, maintenance and supply are managed, and the daily rhythms of movement between the islands and the strait are controlled. Here, the principle of presence-by-shadow is embodied: precise logistical control that is unseen by the eye, but holds the strings of the sea from behind the curtain.

 

Al-Khokha: The Supply Node and the Security Shadow on the West Coast

 

Al-Khokha, the coastal city between Mocha and Hodeidah, today represents one of the most important operational nodes in the UAE's influence system on the West Coast. Since 2018, it has transformed from a small transit area into a logistical supply and provisioning base used to support forces deployed along the coastal strip down to Bab al-Mandab. A 2022 ICG report noted that "Al-Khokha has become an advanced supply center within the Emirati influence network, from which field operations and logistical supplies towards Mocha and Hays are managed."

 

In engineering terms, Al-Khokha witnessed rapid expansion works, including the construction of fuel depots, vehicle maintenance facilities, helipads, and barracks for field troops. Field reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (2021–2022) documented the existence of temporary detention sites used for field investigations, some inside closed logistical facilities belonging to local UAE-backed formations.

 

The Washington Post (2023) described Al-Khokha as "the unmentioned supply center," alluding to its absence from political discourse despite its importance in managing the military supply chain. The newspaper mentioned that the forces stationed there operate in a "shadow presence" (al-hudur bil-zil) pattern—intensive field presence without official declaration—which gives the UAE the ability to manage military and maritime supply secretly and effectively.

 

On the security front, Al-Khokha is used as a buffer zone between the frontlines to the north and Mocha to the south. Field data is collected and analyzed there before being relayed to command in Mocha or Perim. A 2023 report from Stratfor indicated that "Al-Khokha contains ground surveillance units equipped with positioning systems and radio transmitters, acting as an advanced operations room that manages daily logistical tasks."

 

Socially, the city's features have changed markedly. Traditional fishing and agriculture have declined in favor of security and service professions linked to the new bases. Locals speaking to Al-Masdar Online (2023) mentioned "the spread of new checkpoints and unregulated urban expansion on the city's outskirts." This coincided with rising rent prices and increased demand for small commercial services catering to the military units.

 

Deep down, Al-Khokha today represents the rear support loop for the Mocha workshop and the Perim switchboard; it is a supply depot that moves in the shadows. No flag is raised over its presence, but it maintains the pulse of the UAE's influence network across the Red Sea, confirming that control does not always need declaration, but rather a silent ability to operate the field without noise.

 

Perim: The Strait's Switchboard and the Red Sea's Telephone

 

In the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the waterway through which more than five million barrels of oil pass daily, lies the small island of Perim (Mayyun), which has transformed in recent years into a strategic node in the UAE's maritime influence project. Satellite images analyzed by the Associated Press (2021) revealed a new 1,850-meter runway and aircraft hangars, while a 2022 Washington Post report described the island as "the strait's switchboard that connects the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea."

 

The presence on Perim developed in three overlapping phases: an initial positioning phase (2016–2018), which saw the establishment of a dirt airstrip and temporary logistical support facilities; then a fortification phase (2019–2021), where permanent construction began, the runway was expanded, and military communication facilities and fortified depots were built; and finally, a tactical operation phase (2022–2024), marked by the island's integration into the maritime surveillance network extending between Al-Riyan, Socotra, and Balhaf.

 

A report by the US center Stratfor explained that "Perim Island has become an advanced operations center that allows for monitoring ships transiting the strait and controlling maritime communication lines between East and West." A 2023 ICG report also noted that "the Emirati presence on Perim is part of a larger project linking influence bases from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Aden."

 

The forces stationed on the island are managed via local proxies belonging to the formations of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, forces that are logistically supported by Abu Dhabi and operate within the "West Coast Forces." This model of "management by delegation" gives the UAE flexibility in political deniability while maintaining full operational capability. A 2023 report in The Independent (UK) quoted security sources saying "the island is effectively managed by a local command network with undeclared Emirati supervision."

 

Militarily, Perim's location allows for monitoring the international corridor and controlling the movement of commercial and military vessels in the strait. Its facilities are also used as a logistical supply station for ships and drones. According to a Reuters analysis (2022), "The new runway allows for the takeoff of reconnaissance aircraft and long-range drones that can reach the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden in minutes."

 

But this military dominance has raised sovereignty concerns within Yemen. The government described the presence of these facilities as a violation of national sovereignty, while the UAE justified its activity as part of efforts to secure international navigation. Yemeni researchers point out that "Perim represents the true meaning of undeclared control: a Yemeni island with local administration and an external strategic decision."

 

In sum, Perim has become a central link between the Arabian and Red Seas, and an integral part of the "Two Banks Network" system that gives the UAE a position to control one of the most important maritime passages in the world.

 

Perim Island's importance is not limited to its geographical location; it extends to its growing role as an intelligence and technical platform in the UAE's influence network. Since 2020, satellite images and maritime intelligence sources have revealed that the facilities on the island are not just an operational structure for surface surveillance, but also include advanced equipment for encrypted communications and maritime sensors.

 

A 2022 Reuters report indicated that "the technical system on Perim includes electronic monitoring equipment capable of tracking radio signals from ships and aircraft," while The Washington Post (2023) stated that "the island has turned into a maritime listening post that serves information-gathering operations from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Aden." France's Intelligence Online (2024) also published that Perim today forms part of the regional surveillance network managed by the UAE through a mix of Israeli and American technology.

 

In engineering terms, the island has seen an expansion of its infrastructure since 2021, including the construction of communication towers and low-profile radar devices, alongside mini-data centers operating with seawater cooling systems to reduce energy consumption. These technologies are typically used in continuous surveillance systems that rely on artificial intelligence to analyze maritime and aerial traffic. According to a 2023 study by the Middle East Institute in Washington, these systems "allow for real-time monitoring of strategic corridors and give the UAE a proactive ability to identify threats or logistical opportunities."

 

Local Yemeni sources quoted former officers saying "the island is also used to train Yemeni reconnaissance teams on maritime surveillance techniques, and that some engineers from Gulf telecommunications companies participated in installing the monitoring equipment." This integration of local training and foreign technology has made Perim a dual center combining technical intelligence with field operations.

 

On the diplomatic side, regional countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have expressed concern about the advanced nature of the facilities on the island. Al-Araby Al-Jadeed (2024) quoted an Arab diplomatic source as saying, "The presence of these technologies on Perim Island makes it an electronic eye on one of the most important global passages, and creates an overlap with the interests of other maritime powers."

 

In this sense, Perim is transforming from the strait's switchboard into an advanced intelligence node, one that doesn't just watch the sea but analyzes it and redirects its political and military reading. It is not just an island on the map of influence, but a data center for the Red Sea, where geography mixes with cybernetics, and the strait with information.

 

Aden: The Network Capital and the Dual-Influence Laboratory

 

In Aden, political and military threads intertwine to form the most complex node of power and influence in the Yemeni scene. Since the Southern Transitional Council (STC) imposed its control over the city in 2019 with direct Emirati support, Abu Dhabi has worked to install this entity as its political and security arm through systematic operations to liquidate its opponents within the city, prevent the return of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to the interim capital, and obstruct the convening of parliament in Aden via on-the-ground pressure tactics and attacks on the Maasheeq Palace on more than one occasion. The UAE also oversaw the building of security and military forces outside of government authority and established a network of secret prisons in Al-Buraiqa and Little Aden managed by Emirati officers and local loyalists, accompanied by arrest campaigns against activists and officers who rejected the new influence. Concurrently, Aden Port's activity was gradually disrupted in favor of diverting shipping traffic toward ports managed by Emirati companies, while an expanded military base was established at Al-Anad, managed by Emirati forces overseeing the city's air and land space. These moves combined enabled Abu Dhabi to impose comprehensive dominance over Aden—media, security, and economic—transforming it into a parallel capital operating according to a "networked management" model that blends security, economic, and administrative influence.

 

A 2022 Human Rights Watch report documented the existence of detention centers affiliated with the Security Belt forces in the city, operating outside the official judicial framework, reflecting the duality of authority between the legitimate government and UAE-backed formations. This administrative duality also appeared in the management of the port and airport. According to a 2022 Financial Times report, "Aden Port operates within a dual operating system in which local companies linked to the UAE participate alongside the Aden Ports Authority." The airport, meanwhile, underwent security and technical upgrades that made it part of the maritime and aerial surveillance system linked to the Two Banks Network.

 

Politically, Aden represents a meeting point for the interests of regional powers; Riyadh seeks to stabilize the government and its institutions, while Abu Dhabi focuses on building lasting institutional influence. A 2023 ICG report described the city as "the political laboratory where the Coalition is testing the balance of influence between the two banks of the Red Sea." This duality has made Aden the network's management center and a platform for coordinating movement among the five keys of control: Shabwa, Balhaf, Al-Riyan, Perim, and Mocha.

Socially, this composition has been reflected in the city's urban fabric. The cost of living has risen and public services have declined, while a new class of workers in security and logistical facilities has emerged. An academic at Aden University described the city: "Aden today is not the capital of a state, but a control panel in a multi-level system of influence." Thus, Aden has become the heart of the network and the facade of the influence project that mixes security, economics, and politics.

 

The African Extension: The Opposite Triangle on the Other Bank

 

On the opposite bank of the Red Sea, the UAE extends its threads of influence across the Horn of Africa, closing the circle around Yemen's maritime corridors. This extension forms the opposing wing of the Two Banks Network and reflects a UAE strategy that combines maritime investment with military positioning.

 

The first link began from the Assab base in Eritrea in 2015, where the UAE built runways and ammunition depots used to support its operations on the West Coast. A 2019 Reuters report described the base as the "lung of UAE operations in the Red Sea." With the decline in military activity after 2019, the base transformed into an intelligence and logistical support station.

 

In Berbera (Somaliland), DP World signed a 30-year agreement to develop the port, giving Abu Dhabi a permanent presence in the Gulf of Aden. According to a 2020 Financial Times report, "Berbera has transformed into a commercial-military platform that gives the UAE the ability to monitor the corridors toward Bab al-Mandab." In Djibouti, despite the termination of the DP World contract at the Doraleh terminal, the UAE continued its economic presence through intermediary companies. Meanwhile, Port Sudan in Sudan formed the third extension of the triangle, where the UAE is seeking to develop a new port as part of long-term strategic investments.

 

A 2023 Foreign Policy report indicated that "the Emirati presence in the Horn of Africa represents an integrated logistical support system for the influence network on the Yemeni bank." According to Chatham House (2024), "Whoever controls the bases on the African bank holds the upper hand in determining the security of the Red Sea." In this picture, the triangle of influence is completed via the pier, the runway, and the concession: the pier to supply ships, the runway for surveillance, and the concession to ensure a legal and investment presence.

 

An Influence Apparatus with Five Keys

 

When assembling the threads of the picture from Shabwa to Berbera, it becomes clear that the Emirati project is no longer just a military intervention in the Yemen war; it has transformed into an engineering-geopolitical influence structure that operates according to the logic of the sea, not the land. This structure relies on five main operational keys: the Source in Shabwa (Marrah Camp), the Lip at Balhaf, the Tower at Al-Riyan, the Central Switchboard at Perim, and the Workshop at Mocha, with an administrative network head in Aden and a corresponding extension in the Horn of Africa.

 

A 2023 C4ADS report described this system as a "low-cost, high-flexibility influence model" that relies on local proxies instead of direct presence. The ICG saw it as an "experiment in managing control without occupation." Chatham House (2024) adds: "Whoever has the ability to operate or disrupt ports possesses the power to decide the fate of the coastal state."

 

By this logic, the Two Banks Network can be seen as a complete influence apparatus: it integrates ports, airports, and islands into a single system to steer policies via the sea. It is not just a network of bases, but a control system over Yemeni and regional geography, redefining the concept of sovereignty in an era of flexible influence.

 

 

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